s. 1American Hesitation and Chinese Hesitation: The Crisis of Trust and the Struggle for Global Legitimacy in the 21st Century
Yavuz KAYA
Abstract
This article argues that explaining US–Israel relations solely through the lens of the “Zionist lobby” is insufficient, and instead examines this relationship at the intersection of global power competition, economic-political interests, and security strategies. The study first examines the different strategic approaches of the US and China within the framework of the concepts of hard power, soft power, and sharp power. It then concretises the phenomenon of the ‘American caveat’ through Turkey's crisis of confidence due to US policies on the PKK/YPG, the questioning of US bases in the Gulf after the Doha attack, Europe's strategic dilemmas in the context of the Ukraine war, and the divergent reactions in the Global South.
The article demonstrates that the financial dependencies created by China's Belt and Road Initiative have given rise to a new ‘Chinese hesitation’, particularly through different examples in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In this context, the Palestinian issue is positioned not merely as a regional crisis, but as a symbolic arena of global competition where the unconditional support of the US intersects with China's strategic moves.
Consequently, the loss of US credibility across a broad geography, from the Gulf to Turkey, from Europe to the Global South, and the limitation of China's appeal to debt trap debates, reveal both an ‘American hesitation’ and an increasingly apparent ‘Chinese hesitation’ in today's international system. The Palestinian issue is the most visible reflection of this multi-layered power struggle.
Key Concepts: American Hesitancy, Chinese Hesitancy, Hard Power, Soft Power, Sharp Power, Global Threat Discourse, Economic-Political Competition, Europe's Dilemma, Differentiation of the Global South, Palestinian Issue.
s. 2Introduction
In the international relations literature, the explanation of US support for Israel is often limited to the ‘Zionist lobby’ or domestic political dynamics, leading to the neglect of broader geopolitical and economic-political dimensions of the issue.
However, the US-Israel alliance is multi-layered and cannot be reduced to a single factor. Behind this relationship lies a broad equation ranging from security strategies to energy policies, from global threat discourses to economic conflicts of interest. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the US strengthened its Middle East-centred military presence within the framework of the ‘global war on terror’ doctrine.
The Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq are concrete examples of this approach. However, over the past twenty-plus years, the impact of this rhetoric has waned, giving rise to a crisis of legitimacy both in the American public sphere and on the international stage. Today, Washington is attempting to fill this void by framing China's rise as a new ‘global threat.’
China's establishment of vast investment and infrastructure networks stretching from Africa to Latin America, Europe to the Middle East under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) stands in sharp contrast to the US's military base-centred ‘hard power’ approach. This picture adds a new power struggle to today's international politics, one that is driven not only by military interventions but also by energy security, supply chains, critical minerals and global investment competition.
However, the ‘American hesitation’ is not limited to the Palestinian issue. Following the Doha attack, the perception that US bases in Qatar and the Gulf region in general invite new threats rather than providing security has seriously undermined trust in Washington. The US support for the PKK/YPG in Turkey's fight against terrorism has eroded Ankara's trust in Washington, even within the framework of NATO alliance, and has led Turkey to seek new security and alliances. The US's ‘carrotand-stick’ strategy during the Ukraine war, avoiding direct conflict with Russia while burdening Europe and mockingly criticising the EU over its energy dependence, has deepened the crisis of confidence among European leaders.
In this context, the Palestinian issue has become more than just a regional crisis; it has become a symbolic reflection of global power competition. This issue, which was kept on the agenda during the Cold War through the ‘Soviet hesitation,’ is now being reshaped in the context of ‘American hesitation.’ Europe's increasing criticism, the diverse reactions of the Global South, and China's support for Palestine are concrete indicators of this transformation.
Consequently, it is insufficient to interpret the US–Israel relationship solely through the lens of a onedimensional lobbying activity. To understand this relationship, it is necessary to consider global power competition, security discourses, and economic-political interests together. This article will first examine US and Chinese strategies within the framework of hard/soft/sharp power concepts, then concretise the phenomenon of the ‘American hesitation’ with case studies from Turkey, Qatar, Europe, and the Global South, and finally position the Palestinian issue at the centre of this competition.
s. 3Theoretical Framework
The Concepts of Hard Power and Soft Power
In international relations, the concept of power has long been defined solely in terms of military capacity and coercive instruments, i.e. hard power. The realist tradition has accepted as natural that states resort to military power and coercive methods to protect their interests. Joseph Nye (1990, 2004), however, challenged this one-dimensional understanding and introduced the concept of soft power. According to Nye, states can gain influence not only through coercion and force, but also through cultural appeal, diplomatic relations, and values.
Hard power relies on direct and tangible tools such as military invasions, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressure. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 or NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 are typical examples of hard power. This type of power can yield short-term results; however, it carries high costs, risks losing legitimacy in the international public sphere, and risks creating instability in the long term.
In contrast, soft power relies on voluntarism and persuasion. For example, the cultural and intellectual appeal created by the United States through Hollywood films, the technological appeal of Silicon Valley, or universities such as Harvard and MIT are the main sources of soft power. Similarly, the network of values established by the European Union through human rights and democracy norms is an institutionalised form of soft power.
The comparison between the US and China in the 21st century clearly illustrates the practical implications of these concepts. The US has continued its tradition of hard power through its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001, its permanent bases in the Middle East, and NATOcentred security agreements. However, the high cost of these policies and the legitimacy crisis they created have damaged Washington's global image.
China, on the other hand, has avoided direct military engagement and focused on soft power tools. Within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has created economic appeal through railways and ports in Africa, power plants in Asia, strategic port investments in Europe, and infrastructure projects in Latin America. Furthermore, Confucius Institutes, Chinese scholarship programmes, and cultural diplomacy are complementary elements of Beijing's soft power strategy.
However, as most of the projects implemented by China create financial dependency rather than mere attraction, they sometimes open the door to discussions of sharp power. This point demonstrates that theoretical distinctions should no longer be evaluated solely on the hard–soft axis, but rather through new hybrid strategies.
Global Threat Discourse
In international relations, the ‘global threat discourse’ is one of the most fundamental tools used by major powers to legitimise their foreign policy choices. This discourse reshapes not only security policies but also alliance structures, economic strategies, and diplomatic relations.
11 September and the ‘War on Terror’ Paradigm
The attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in US national security discourse. The administration of President George W. Bush adopted the doctrine of ‘pre-emptive war’ in its 2002 National Security Strategy and placed the ‘global war on terror’ at the centre of American foreign policy. This approach legitimised the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq; NATO's involvement in
s. 4the Afghanistan operations within this framework demonstrated that the discourse was being propagated through alliances.
However, over time, this discourse encountered serious limitations:
Cost dimension: According to Brown University's Costs of War report, the cost of US counterterrorism operations between 2001 and 2021 exceeded $8 trillion. Loss of legitimacy: The invasions, carried out on unverified grounds such as weapons of mass destruction, undermined the credibility of the US in the global public sphere. Impact on domestic politics: Prolonged wars have given rise to criticism of ‘forever wars’ within American society and strengthened isolationist tendencies.
From Terrorism to China: A New Perception of Threat
In the second decade of the 21st century, the US ‘global threat narrative’ has increasingly shifted towards a China-focused framework. Washington defines not only Beijing's military capabilities but also its economic investments, technological advances (5G, artificial intelligence, chip industry) and growing influence in international organisations as a strategic challenge.
Three key dimensions of this discourse stand out:
1. Military and geostrategic dimension: Military build-up in the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, and the re-emergence of critical points such as Bagram Air Base. 2. Economic dimension: Framing the financial dependency created by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in countries as a ‘global security threat’. 3. Social and cyber dimension: China's media investments, allegations of disinformation, cyber attacks and technology competition (Huawei, TikTok) have become new security elements in US discourse.
The Function of Threat Discourse
From the US perspective, the concept of ‘global threat’ is not merely a foreign policy rhetoric; it also serves to:
Consolidating allies (e.g. AUKUS, Quad, NATO's Indo-Pacific outreach), Mobilising public support in domestic politics, Justifying military spending (a defence budget of $860 billion as of 2024).
Legitimacy Crisis and Alternative Discourses
However, the effectiveness of this discourse is not unlimited. The loss of trust following Iraq and Afghanistan, Europe's development of independent discourses, and increasing criticism of the US in the Global South are making Washington's threat discourse more controversial. In this vacuum, China is attempting to create an alternative appeal by constructing its own discourse around ‘development partnership’ and ‘win-win’.
Beyond Soft Power: Sharp Power and Debt Trap Diplomacy
Joseph Nye's concept of soft power is based on generating voluntary cooperation through charm and persuasion. Cultural values, educational programmes, diplomacy and partnership rhetoric are the main tools of soft power. However, in recent years, the methods used by authoritarian regimes to gain
s. 5influence internationally have brought to the fore a form of power that goes beyond this definition. The concept of ‘sharp power’ is used in reports by the Carnegie Endowment and the National Endowment for Democracy (Walker & Ludwig, 2017) to describe the strategies employed by China and Russia in particular to establish influence through media, information flow, economic dependency, and financial pressure.
The Difference Between Sharp Power and Soft Power
While soft power functions through voluntariness and appeal, sharp power creates more of an asymmetric dependency. In soft power, actors maintain cooperation of their own volition; in sharp power, financial pressure and strategic constraints narrow the actors' room for manoeuvre. Therefore, sharp power conceals an element of coercion beneath relationships that appear to be cooperative.
Debt Trap Diplomacy and Examples
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one of the most notable platforms for this strategy. While high loans and infrastructure investments may seem attractive at first, they create unsustainable debt burdens.
Sri Lanka (Hambantota Port): Due to the inability to repay a $1.4 billion debt, the port was transferred to China for 99 years. This is the most well-known example of ‘debt-for-asset swap’. Zambia: Dependence on energy and telecommunications infrastructure has developed due to loans received from China, and Beijing's role in the country's external debt crisis has been a subject of debate. Kenya (Mombasa Port): Claims that the port would be transferred to China if the loan from the China Exim Bank could not be repaid have fuelled discussions about the debt trap. Montenegro (Europe): The Bar–Boljare motorway, built with Chinese financing, accounts for 25% of the country's debt, and even the EU has warned Montenegro about these agreements. Latin America: Chinese loans in Venezuela have created long-term dependencies in exchange for oil exports.
These examples show that China creates not only economic cooperation but also strategic leverage.
Regional Reflections of Sharp Power
Sharp power manifests itself not only in bilateral economic relations but also in regional crises. While China takes a political stance in favour of Palestine in the Middle East, it uses this as a means of creating geopolitical manoeuvring space against the US rather than out of humanitarian concerns. This situation leads to the Palestinian issue being interpreted not only as an ‘American concern’ but also increasingly as a visible ‘Chinese concern’.
Therefore, China's global influence cannot be simply defined as a ‘soft power’ success. The debt relationships established through BRI projects have given rise to a strategy that combines attraction and coercion. This strategy is increasingly understood in international literature as a ‘soft–sharp power synthesis’ and reflects the new face of 21st-century power competition.
US Strategy: Post-9/11 Hard Power Tradition and Military Bases
The attacks of 11 September 2001 created a radical transformation in US security strategy. The Bush administration, in its 2002 National Security Strategy, declared the doctrine of ‘pre-emptive security’, seeing itself as having the right to intervene militarily without waiting for threats to materialise. Although controversial in international law, this approach institutionalised Washington's tradition of hard power.
s. 6Instruments of Hard Power: Bases and Occupations
In the post-2001 period, the United States expanded its network of military bases and used them not only for operational purposes but also as instruments of political pressure.
Afghanistan (Bagram Air Base): Served as a symbol of the global war on terror, while also providing strategic surveillance capabilities over Central Asia. Iraq Occupation (2003): Represented the peak of hard power, but the false claims about weapons of mass destruction undermined US legitimacy. Gulf Bases: Al-Udeid in Qatar, the Naval Base in Bahrain, and forward deployments in Kuwait are the pillars of the US's permanent presence in the Middle East.
Cost and Legitimacy Crisis
According to Brown University's Costs of War Project report, the total cost of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and related operations between 2001 and 2021 exceeded $8 trillion. This has not only been a budgetary cost; it has also resulted in a diplomatic cost:
Loss of trust among allies: While European public opinion opposed the Iraq war, US unilateralism caused rifts within NATO. Domestic political fatigue: Criticism of “endless wars” gained traction among both Democrats and Republicans, strengthening withdrawal policies during the Trump and Biden administrations. International legal crisis: Cases such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib have contradicted the US's human rights rhetoric.
Reflections of US Hard Power Today
Although the doctrine of ‘pre-emptive security’ is criticised, the US continues to employ hard power tools by reproducing its threat rhetoric:
Latin America: Drug cartels and migrant influxes are securitised, creating political ground against Chinese investments in the region. Indo-Pacific: Security collaborations such as AUKUS (US–UK–Australia) and QUAD (US– Japan–India–Australia) are an extension of the strategy to contain China. Middle East: The strategic alliance with Israel, the positioning of Iran as a threat, and the protection of bases in the Gulf demonstrate the US's enduring hard power reflex.
The US security strategy has been reshaped within the framework of the post-9/11 ‘pre-emptive security’ doctrine and relies on hard power tools. However, the costs and legitimacy crises of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have made the sustainability of this approach debatable. Nevertheless, Washington continues to maintain its hard power tradition today in order to counterbalance China's growing influence across a broad geography stretching from Latin America to the Pacific.
China's Strategy: Soft Power, Sharp Power and Global Influence (In-depth)
Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has positioned itself as a rising power in the international system and has developed a strategy that combines soft power and increasingly prominent sharp power tools to increase its global influence.
Elements of Soft Power
China's soft power stands out in three key dimensions:
s. 71. Economic appeal: Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), cooperation agreements have been signed with more than 150 countries as of 2023, with the total value of infrastructure investments exceeding $1 trillion (World Bank, 2019). 2. Cultural diplomacy: Language and culture programmes are run in over 140 countries through Confucius Institutes. This ensures that Chinese culture stands out as a source of soft power on a global scale. 3. Education and scholarships: Scholarships awarded to thousands of students each year enhance the international appeal of Chinese universities, while also cultivating a Beijingaligned elite class.
Sharp Power Elements
However, China's strategy is not limited to charm. The sharp power dimension operates through economic dependency and political pressure:
Debt trap diplomacy: Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port, Montenegro's motorway project, and the credit crises in Kenya and Zambia are the most well-known examples of this strategy. Technology dependency: Huawei's 5G infrastructure and platforms such as TikTok are areas where China has created global dependency in the digital sphere. Bans and security investigations in the US and EU highlight the controversial nature of this influence. Media and disinformation: Chinese state-affiliated media outlets (CGTN, Xinhua) and social media networks are used as tools to shape perceptions in favour of Beijing, particularly in the Global South.
Global Spheres of Influence
China's strategy manifests itself in different regions using different tools:
Africa: Infrastructure projects (Ethiopian railway, Nigerian power plants) and health diplomacy (COVID-19 vaccine donations). Latin America: Oil-for-credit loans to Venezuela, agricultural and mining investments in Brazil, nuclear energy cooperation in Argentina. Europe: Acquisition of the Port of Piraeus in Greece, the 17+1 initiative in Central and Eastern Europe. Middle East: 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Iran, energy infrastructure investments in the Gulf, diplomatic support on the Palestinian issue.
Current Dynamics (2020s)
Post-COVID-19 health diplomacy: China increased its soft power capacity through vaccine donations and medical equipment aid; however, the backlash in some regions due to quality issues with this aid reinforced the perception of sharp power. Technology competition: US sanctions against China's chip industry (2022 CHIPS Act) aim to slow Beijing's technological rise, while China seeks to turn this pressure into an opportunity to increase its technological autonomy. Claim to leadership of the Global South: Through BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China is presenting itself as the leader of an alternative order to the US.
China's strategy goes beyond soft power in the classical sense and is based on a soft–sharp power synthesis. This synthesis produces both attraction and coercion simultaneously; particularly in the Global South, it creates both the allure of cooperation and debt dependency. Thus, Beijing's global influence increasingly operates through strategic dependency and coercive relationships rather than voluntary partnerships.
s. 8Cold War Context: Soviet Hesitation
Throughout the Cold War, the Palestinian issue was not merely a regional conflict, but also one of the reflection areas of the ideological and strategic competition of the bipolar system. In the process that began with the establishment of Israel in 1948, the US quickly recognised Israel, making it the strategic ally of the Western bloc in the Middle East. In contrast, the Soviet Union, although initially supporting Israel, soon took a position in favour of the Palestinian movement and Arab states.
This preference was shaped by three factors:
Ideological dimension: Within the framework of anti-imperialist rhetoric, the Soviets interpreted the Palestinian cause as a struggle for independence against the West. Geostrategic dimension: The Middle East's energy resources and geopolitical position served as a critical front for the USSR in encircling the US. Military dimension: The Soviets strengthened the pro-Palestinian front by arming countries such as Egypt and Syria and providing them with military advisers.
In this context, while the Palestinian issue was a matter of ‘stability’ and ‘Israel's security’ for the West, it served as a means for the Soviets to break the US's influence in the region. The adoption of socialist rhetoric by Palestinian organisations (PLO, DFLP, PFLP) further accentuated this polarisation.
Post-Cold War: New Balances
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally changed the global context of the Palestinian issue. With the emergence of a unipolar international system, the US became an almost unrivalled actor in the Middle East.
Three key features of this period stand out:
The Oslo Process (1993): Negotiations mediated by the US were an attempt to control the Palestinian issue under the rhetoric of a ‘peace process.’ However, Israel's continued settlement policy effectively stalled the process. Europe's passivity: Although the EU provided financial aid and diplomatic support, it remained dependent on the US for security and therefore failed to play a decisive role. Russia's retreat: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost much of its influence in the region due to economic and political crises.
In the post-Cold War era, the Palestinian issue has been left to the unilateral initiative of the US rather than global power competition. This has created a balance that prioritises Israel's security concerns and relegates Palestine's demand for statehood to a secondary position.
American Hesitation Today
21. In the second decade of the 21st century, the United States' unconditional support for Israel is seriously undermining its global legitimacy. The debilitating effect of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the instability following the Arab Spring, and especially the humanitarian crisis in Gaza after 7 October 2023 have made Washington's rhetoric and policies even more controversial.
Various actors are attempting to fill this void:
China: China is taking a tougher stance against Israel in the UN Security Council, claiming ‘moral superiority’ by providing diplomatic support for Palestine. However, this stance is often
s. 9an extension of China's global positioning against the US; that is, it is motivated by geostrategic rather than humanitarian considerations. Europe: Within the EU, countries such as Spain, Ireland and Norway are taking steps towards recognising the Palestinian state, while Germany and France are more cautious. This division limits Europe's capacity to develop a collective foreign policy. Global South: Countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America generally criticise the US's unilateral policies, but are also cautious towards Beijing due to China's investments and criticisms of the ‘debt trap’. This situation makes the Palestinian issue readable through both American and Chinese reservations.
Therefore, today Palestine is not just a Middle Eastern issue; it serves as a global mirror that reveals the US's legitimacy crisis, China's alternative order discourse, and Europe's strategic dilemma.
Europe's Dilemma: Atlantic Allegiance and China's Appeal
Historically, the European Union has been dependent on the US for security, acting as part of the transatlantic alliance under the NATO umbrella. Throughout the Cold War, this dependence was seen as a legitimate and necessary framework, with US military power serving as a security guarantee for Europe. However, in the 21st century, China's economic rise has created a new strategic dilemma within the EU: Atlantic dependence or China's economic appeal?
Atlantic Dependence: The Indispensability of the US in Security
Europe remains dependent on the US in terms of military and security.
NATO: Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2022 has once again demonstrated NATO's indispensability for Europe. Germany's declaration of a ‘Zeitenwende’ (turning point) and its decision to increase its defence budget prove that dependence on the US security umbrella continues. US pressure: Washington is demanding that Europe take tougher measures against Chinese investments, particularly pressuring for a ban on Huawei in 5G infrastructure.
China's appeal: trade and investment dependency
On the other hand, China is both a large market and a source of investment for Europe.
17+1 Initiative: Central and Eastern European countries (particularly Hungary and Serbia) have left the door open to Chinese investment, leading to divisions within the EU. Piraeus Port (Greece): Operated by China's COSCO company, the port has become one of Europe's largest maritime trade centres, strengthening Beijing's strategic presence within the EU. Trade dependency: As of 2022, China is the EU's largest trading partner. Germany's automotive sector (Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes) has become dependent on the Chinese market, which is why Berlin is acting cautiously towards Beijing. France's stance: The Macron administration has emphasised strategic autonomy; while maintaining economic relations with China, it has sought to defend Europe's independent line against US security pressure.
s. 10Reflections on the Palestinian issue
This dilemma is also reflected in the EU's policies on Palestine.
Approach parallel to the US: Germany and some Western European countries are taking a position closer to Israel, emphasising security concerns. Line aligning with China: Countries such as Greece and Hungary are more distant from the US's unilateral policies due to the ties they have established through Chinese investments. Pro-Palestinian stances: Countries such as Spain, Ireland, Norway and, more recently, Belgium have taken steps towards recognising the Palestinian state, demonstrating that Europe is not speaking with one voice. This divergence highlights the limitations of the EU's capacity to formulate foreign policy.
Current Strategic Dilemma
The real question for Europe is: Which is more indispensable, the US security guarantee or China's economic appeal? This dilemma shows that the EU is in a state of ‘dual dependency,’ dependent on both transatlantic relations and China. The Palestinian issue is one area where this contradictory position has become apparent.
Europe's rhetoric on Palestine reflects not only ‘moral’ or ‘humanitarian’ concerns, but also the strategic dilemma between security dependence on the US and economic dependence on China.
Crisis of Trust in the US in Qatar and the Arabian Peninsula Following the Doha Attack
The Doha Attack and the Perception of Security
The attack in Doha has exposed Qatar's security vulnerabilities, despite the US's critical military assets in Qatar, such as the Al-Udeid Air Base. The occurrence of such an attack in a country hosting one of the US's largest bases in the region has raised the question among both the Qatari leadership and the Arab public: ‘Does the US military presence truly provide security, or does it invite new threats?’
Qatar's Strategic Manoeuvres
Following the Doha attack, Qatar has shifted towards diversification in its security policy:
Relations with the US: While not closing the US base, Qatar has begun to question its trust in Washington. In particular, the US's ambivalent stance during the 2017 Gulf Crisis, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar, reinforced Doha's distrust. Rapprochement with Turkey: After 2017, Qatar increased its military cooperation with Turkey and strengthened the presence of Turkish troops in Qatar. This signalled a search for alternative security guarantees to the US. Balancing with Iran: Qatar has kept dialogue channels open with Iran in the context of energy and security, cooperating with Tehran particularly in the operation of joint natural gas fields. The China factor: Qatar has deepened its energy and infrastructure cooperation with China within the framework of the BRI, thereby attempting to balance its economic dependence on the US.
s. 11Trust Crisis in the Arabian Peninsula
Qatar's stance is not unique to Doha; trust in the US is being questioned across the entire Arabian Peninsula.
Saudi Arabia: The US's failure to respond quickly enough to the Houthi attacks on Aramco facilities in 2019 led to a crisis of confidence in Riyadh. This paved the way for Saudi Arabia's diplomatic rapprochement with China (the 2023 Iran-Saudi normalisation brokered by Beijing). UAE: While maintaining relations with Washington, it has opened the door to Chinese investment and technology (especially 5G). Kuwait and Oman: They are acting more cautiously and seeking multilateral security relationships.
After the Doha attack, trust in the US in Qatar and the Arabian Peninsula in general has been seriously shaken. US bases are no longer seen as an absolute guarantee of security; on the contrary, they are perceived as the focus of new threats. To fill this security void, regional countries are diversifying their relations with Turkey, China, and even Russia. This situation demonstrates that the US's role as a ‘security provider’ in the Middle East is eroding and that American hesitation can be read not only through Palestinian but also through all Gulf policies.
Turkey's Fight Against Terrorism and the Trust Crisis with the US
Historical Background
Since the 1980s, Turkey has experienced serious tensions in its relations with the US while fighting the PKK terrorist organisation.
1980s–90s: Although the US viewed Turkey as a critical ally in NATO's southern flank during the Cold War, its turning a blind eye to PKK activities in Europe and the US during the same period caused unease in Ankara. 1991 Gulf War: The power vacuum created in northern Iraq provided a safe haven for the PKK; the US ‘Operation Desert Storm’ deepened this vacuum. Turkey assessed that US policies in Iraq weakened its own security.
The 2000s: Counter-terrorism and Strategic Rifts
Post-9/11: While the US focused on global counter-terrorism, Turkey wanted to see the PKK included in the same scope. However, although Washington officially recognised the PKK as a terrorist organisation, it failed to meet Ankara's expectations on the ground. 2003 Iraq Invasion: The US invasion of Iraq opened up a new arena for the PKK. The strengthening of Kurdish groups in northern Iraq reinforced the perception in Turkey that the US was providing ‘indirect support’.
Current Developments: YPG Support and the Trust Crisis
Syrian Civil War (post-2011): The US used the YPG (the Syrian branch of the PKK) as its ‘ground force’ in the fight against ISIS. This policy was deemed unacceptable by Turkey, as the YPG has organic ties to the PKK, which directly threatens Turkey's national security. Weapons and training support: According to Pentagon reports, since 2014, the US has provided the YPG with thousands of truckloads of weapons and ammunition and has provided training support through its special forces. This situation has seriously shaken the perception of ‘alliance’ among the Turkish public.
s. 12 The Manbij and East Euphrates crises: The failure to implement agreements made between Turkey and the US accelerated the erosion of trust. Conclusion: In response to these developments, Turkey has turned to steps such as rapprochement with Russia and Iran (the Astana Process), cross-border operations (Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring) and defence diversification (the purchase of S-400s).
The Collapse of Trust in the US and New Searches
From Turkey's perspective, US support for the PKK/YPG has created a rift not only in bilateral relations but also in the perception of security within NATO.
Reducing defence dependency: Turkey has accelerated localisation in the defence industry and has come to the fore with UAV–UCAV technologies. New alliances: Energy and defence cooperation with Russia (TurkStream, S-400), economic relations with China, and strategic partnerships with Qatar are part of Turkey's efforts to diversify its security. Anti-US public opinion: Surveys conducted among the Turkish public show that trust in the US has fallen to its lowest level and that the perception that Washington ‘supports terrorist organisations’ has become entrenched.
The US's support for the PKK/YPG in Turkey's fight against terrorism has created a crisis of confidence that has historical roots but has become particularly pronounced in the last decade. This crisis has led Ankara to limit its relations with Washington to limited cooperation and to turn to alternative alliances and security strategies. Consequently, the ‘American Hesitation’ is strongly evident not only in Palestinian or Gulf policies but also in Turkey's perception of national security.
The US–Russia–EU Triangle: The Ukraine War and the Trust Crisis
The US's Carrot-and-Stick Strategy
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has created a critical test for transatlantic relations. The US has imposed comprehensive sanctions against Russia and provided military support to Ukraine; however, Washington's approach has been based on avoiding direct military conflict. This ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach, i.e. engaging with Russia through diplomatic pressure and limited economic sanctions while leaving the main burden to Europe, has created serious distrust within the EU.
Energy Dependency and US Criticisms
The US has for years criticised Europe's dependence on Russian gas as a strategic weakness. Since the Nord Stream projects in 2011, Washington has been warning European capitals, Berlin in particular. However, when the war broke out, the US's harsh criticism of EU leaders at meetings, almost as if ‘lecturing’ them, provoked a backlash in the European public.
Sarcastic tone: Statements by US officials that ‘energy dependence on Russia was a trap you set for yourselves’ caused unease in Berlin and Brussels. Self-interest: At the same time, the US increased its LNG (liquefied natural gas) exports to Europe, creating the perception that Washington's criticism was not only strategic but also commercially motivated. The EU's necessary transformation: The European Commission's REPowerEU plan to reduce dependence on Russian gas was largely shaped by US pressure and the war.
s. 13Europe's Crisis of Confidence
The US's stance during this process has brought the debate on Europe's strategic autonomy back to the fore:
Macron's departure: French President Macron argued that the model of a ‘Europe under US protection’ was unsustainable and that the EU needed to develop its own security and energy policies. Germany's fragility: Germany, the country most affected by the energy crisis, felt abandoned in the face of US criticism. This paved the way for Berlin to adopt a more pragmatic line in its relations with China. Divisions within the EU: The Baltic states and Poland supported the US's tough stance, while southern European countries took a more cautious approach due to the costs of the energy crisis.
The US's avoidance of direct conflict with Russia while placing the burden on Europe, using a ‘mocking’ tone of criticism over energy dependence, has deepened the crisis of confidence within the EU. This process has accelerated Europe's efforts to build its own strategic autonomy while maintaining its security dependence on the US. Similar to the division seen in the Palestinian issue, Europe's inability to act in unison against the US in the Ukraine war has brought to the fore a new ‘trust in the US’ crisis, alongside the ‘Atlantic commitment–China attraction’ dilemma.
The Role of the Global South
Although the Global South was generally defined as the “non-aligned” bloc during the Cold War, today it has become the most critical arena of competition between the US and China. While there is a general critical consensus regarding US policies, it is not possible to speak of a homogeneous stance on China. On the contrary, each region and country develops different positions according to its own geopolitical and economic vulnerabilities. Therefore, the Palestinian issue must be read not only in the context of an ‘American hesitation’ but also through an increasingly apparent ‘Chinese hesitation’.
The Diverse Fronts of the Global South
Africa: Between Attraction and Debt Trap
The African continent is one of the areas with the highest concentration of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments.
Ethiopia and Nigeria: Thanks to Chinese loans and infrastructure projects, they have gained momentum for growth and positioned Beijing as a strategic development partner. The Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway and energy investments in Nigeria are symbolic examples of this. Kenya and Zambia: Debates over unsustainable debt have fuelled anti-China sentiment. Beijing's stance on the Mombasa Port in Kenya and Zambia's external debt crisis has reinforced criticism of ‘debt trap diplomacy’.
Consequently, China is perceived in Africa both as a ‘hope for development’ and a ‘new source of dependency.’
Latin America: Strategic Partnerships and the Search for Balance
As Latin America attempts to break free from its historical position as the ‘backyard’ of the United States, China is rapidly gaining influence in the region.
s. 14 Venezuela and Bolivia: View China as a strategic partner against US sanctions. Caracas' energy exports and Bolivia's lithium reserves are vital to Beijing. Brazil: The Lula administration is deepening its trade ties with China (particularly soy and iron exports) while also trying not to sever its relations with the US. This is the most striking example of the ‘balance of power’ approach in Latin America.
Therefore, the region presents a front that challenges the US but is not homogeneous in its stance towards China.
Asia: From Close Ally to Security Threat
The Asian continent is the region where China experiences the most intense strategic tension.
Pakistan: Thanks to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the most critical leg of China's ‘belt’ projects, it has become Beijing's closest ally. Despite security risks, Islamabad views China as the key to development and international protection. India: Conversely, India views Beijing as a security threat and plays an active role in the QUAD alliance (with the US, Japan, and Australia). Himalayan border clashes have reinforced India's anti-China stance.
Asia is therefore the region where the ‘China factor’ is most clearly visible.
Reflections on the Palestinian Issue
These differing fronts are also echoed in the Palestinian issue.
African countries condemn Israel's attacks and closely monitor China's support for Palestine; however, they debate the limits of their economic dependence on Beijing. In Latin America (particularly Bolivia, Colombia, Chile), strong political support is being given to Palestine, which is also an extension of an anti-US position. In Asia, countries such as Pakistan are Palestine's strongest defenders, while India takes a different stance due to its strategic relations with Israel.
The Global South is not a unified actor; it is a fragmented front due to different geographical, economic and security dynamics. This fragmentation is also evident in the Palestinian issue; while a common criticism of the US can be produced, countries' experiences and reservations regarding China's rise differ. Therefore, Palestine should be read not only as an ‘American concern’ but also through the increasingly apparent lens of a ‘Chinese concern.’
Discussion: US–China Competition, Trade Concerns, and the Economic-Political Dimension of Wars
The Economic Dynamics of Wars
It is clear that in the 21st century, wars are shaped not only by military superiority or ideological conflict, but also by energy security, critical minerals and supply chains.
Energy: The invasion of Iraq has once again brought the geopolitical importance of oil to the fore, while the war in Ukraine has done the same for natural gas and nuclear energy chains. Critical minerals: Lithium, cobalt and rare earth elements have become new ‘strategic weapons,’ particularly for the green transition and the defence industry. China's share of over 60% of global rare earth production creates a serious dependency for the West.
s. 15 Supply chains: The vulnerabilities exposed by COVID-19 have demonstrated that economic dependencies are at least as decisive as military capabilities in times of global war and crisis.
Balance of Power in US–China Competition
The US tradition of hard power produces short-term results through military bases, security agreements and direct interventions. In contrast, China's soft–sharp power synthesis creates a slower but more lasting impact through long-term economic investments, financial dependencies, and debt trap diplomacy.
Risk for the US: Excessive costs (the total bill for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars exceeded $8 trillion) and loss of legitimacy. Risk for China: Losing the appeal of soft power and creating the perception of ‘new colonialism’; being criticised, particularly in Africa and Latin America, over debt crises. Therefore, the balance of power should be interpreted not only in terms of military capabilities but also in terms of long-term economic sustainability.
Global Threat Discourse and the Search for Legitimacy
The US's global threat discourse took shape after 9/11 through the ‘war on terror,’ but the legitimacy of this discourse has been weakened by failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, Washington is attempting to reproduce the same discourse through China.
Divisions in Europe: The war in Ukraine has led to a crisis of confidence through the US's ‘lecturing’ criticism of Europe's energy dependence. Germany's fragility, France's call for strategic autonomy, and Southern European countries' discomfort with energy costs make these divisions visible. Differentiations in the Global South: Criticisms of the debt trap in Africa, the search for strategic partnerships in Latin America, and the Pakistan–India dilemma in Asia prevent the US rhetoric from creating a universal basis of legitimacy.
The Place of the Palestinian Issue in the Competition
Palestine has become a symbolic area where both American and Chinese reservations intersect.
American reservation: The US's unconditional support for Israel is causing a serious loss of legitimacy in the eyes of both Europe and the Global South. Chinese reluctance: Although Beijing is attempting to fill the void left by the US by providing political support to Palestine, it is also creating suspicion in the Global South due to debt traps and dependency relationships. Symbolic meaning: The Palestinian issue is not merely a regional crisis in today's international system; it has become one of the legitimacy tests of global power competition. The US's ‘security’ and China's ‘development’ discourses are being tested on this issue.
US-China competition is not only a military or diplomatic contest, but a long-term economic-political struggle waged in the energy-mining-trade triangle. Palestine has become the most visible symbol of this struggle; the reliability of the US and the appeal of China are both being tested and debated here.
s. 16Conclusion
Explaining US-Israel relations solely through the lens of the ‘Zionist lobby’ falls far short of reflecting the complexity of today's international relations. This relationship is shaped at the intersection of global power competition, economic-political interests and security strategies.
The hard power-centred security strategy adopted by the US after 9/11 is eroding amid high costs and legitimacy crises, while China's debt and investment diplomacy, masked by the appeal of soft power but increasingly taking on the character of sharp power, is giving rise to a different kind of dependency relationship.
In this context, the US's credibility is being questioned not only through the Palestinian issue in the Middle East, but also through broader geographical fractures:
Crisis of confidence in the Gulf: Following the Doha attack, the perception has grown that US military bases in Qatar and the Arabian Peninsula in general invite new threats rather than providing security guarantees. Saudi Arabia's normalisation with Iran, brokered by China, demonstrates the decline of the US's role as a security provider. Turkey's security crisis: The US's political and military support for the PKK/YPG has undermined Ankara's trust in Washington, even within the framework of NATO alliance. This situation has led Turkey to localise its defence industry and develop alternative partnerships with Russia and China. The concept of ‘American hesitation’ is central to Turkey's security policies in this context. Europe's strategic dilemma: During the Ukraine war, the US's ‘carrot-and-stick’ strategy, which avoided direct conflict with Russia while burdening the EU and making sarcastic remarks about its energy dependence, deepened the crisis of confidence among European leaders. Berlin's fragility, Paris's rhetoric on strategic autonomy, and Southern Europe's cost concerns have highlighted the asymmetry of transatlantic ties.
In parallel, the differing responses of the Global South are limiting the US and China's quest for global legitimacy. In Africa, Chinese investments are generating divided perceptions between hopes for development and criticisms of a debt trap; in Latin America, Venezuela and Bolivia see Beijing as a strategic partner, while Brazil pursues a policy of balance. In Asia, Pakistan has become China's closest ally, while India views it as a direct security threat. Therefore, it is possible to speak not only of an ‘American hesitation’ but also of an increasingly apparent ‘Chinese hesitation’.
Within this multi-layered picture, the Palestinian issue has become not just a regional crisis, but a symbolic arena for global power competition. While the US's unconditional support for Israel erodes its legitimacy, China's rhetoric of support for Palestine is also often read in the shadow of its own economic interests. In this sense, Palestine is the area where both American and Chinese reservations intersect and where the double standards of the international system become most visible.
Ultimately, the US-China rivalry is not only military or diplomatic; it is a multidimensional economicpolitical struggle played out through energy, critical minerals, trade, and financial dependencies. While the credibility of the US is being questioned across a broad geography stretching from the Gulf to Turkey, and from Europe to the Global South, China's appeal is also being tested by debates about ‘new dependencies’. The Palestinian issue has become both a moral legitimacy test and a symbol of power balance in this global competition, thus emerging as one of the most important focal points revealing the geopolitical fractures of the 21st century.
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